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Abstract 
We analyze two types of crop marketing contracts between agricultural producers and processors, 
delivery-at-harvest and an “option-to-purchase” that emerged in US peanut market after the 2002 Farm 
Act. This contract structure is interpreted as a marketing strategy trying to fill the gap left by the former 
quota system.  
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I.  Introduction 
  The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 (hereafter, 2002 Farm Act) eliminated the 
domestic quota farm support system, which has been the cornerstone of the US peanut farm policy since 
1933. The 2002 Farm Act replaced the quota system in the peanut market with Marketing Assistance Loan 
Program (hereafter, MLP). Under the MLP, producers can get a government loan from the Commodity 
Credit Corporation (hereafter, CCC) at a pre-determined loan rate by pledging their crop as collateral. The 
loan can be repaid using the government-set loan repayment rate (LRR). Officially, the LRR is set equal to 
the current (weekly) spot market prices.  
  During the first year of the 2002 Farm Act, two marketing contract types have been observed: 
"Delivery at Harvest" (hereafter, DAH) and the "Option-to-Purchase" (hereafter, OTP). While the DAH 
contract is a typical forward contract with delivery at harvest time, the OTP contract is a hybrid of a 
forward and an option contract.
1 The OTP contract gives the buyer (i.e., peanut sheller) an exclusive right 
but not an obligation to purchase a certain volume of the crop from the farmer. A peculiarity of this OTP 
is that, while in other markets the selling price is tied to either spot market price or to a basis (when 
futures markets exist), the OTP price base is the USDA-determined repayment rate. 
                                                 
1 Sykuta and Purcell (2003) report similar type of contracts for soybeans, in their paper OTP contracts are called 
“Buyer’s call”   3 
  The purpose of this paper is to analyze these two types of contracts that have emerged between 
producers and peanut shellers (i.e., first processors) in order to contribute to the understanding of the role 
of delivery options in agricultural markets. Specifically, we examine their rationale within the 
characteristics of the US peanut market and their interaction with the Marketing Loan Program. We argue 
that the combination of contracts is path dependent and can only been understood by considering the 
peculiar economic history of the US peanut market. In this sense, the combination of contracts may be 
understood as a marketing strategy that tries to fill the gap left by the elimination of the marketing quota 
system. In this context, the OTP contracts play two roles: first, they increase the flexibility of shellers 
when purchasing peanuts and, second, in the context of the introduced MLP, they become a safeguard to 
negotiate (explicitly or implicitly) with the USDA when the latter determines the MLP repayment rate.   
  The paper starts with a brief discussion of the importance of contracts in agriculture and recent 
developments on the topic. Then, we describe the evolution of the US peanut market emphasizing its 
characteristics as a regulated market until 2002, where produced peanuts followed a pre-established 
marketing channel, giving little chance for the farmers to develop marketing experience or infrastructure 
such as on-farm storage facilities, like other crops under marketing loan programs. We show that this 
situation resulted in a very thin or inexistent spot market. Section four analyzes the new contracts 
presenting them as a substitute for the eliminated marketing (quota) system under the new conditions.     
 
II.  Contracts in Agriculture 
There are several reasons for contracts, the most important of course being the need to deal 
information asymmetries (hidden information) and opportunism (hidden action). Contracts are designed so 
as to achieve the second-best in the markets where achievement of the first-best, the most efficient, 
outcome is not possible due to the presence of situations called moral hazard and adverse selection 
(Laffont and Martimort, 2002; Salanie, 1997). These reasons are quite important in the agricultural 
industries    4 
1)  characterized by qualitative heterogeneity of output and the quality’s dependence on the producer 
effort. In particular, contracts specifying quality characteristics are common in meat and poultry 
industries; 
2)  characterized by the presence of strict segregation or identity preservation requirements. For 
example, increasing share of soybeans and corn sold under contracts has been explained by the 
introduction of their genetically modified variations and the processors and elevators requiring 
separation of the “pure” crop from its genetically modified counterpart. 
While quality differences do exist in peanuts and these differences do depend, in part, on the producer’s 
effort, peanut contracts have never substituted spot market transactions for the need to ensure better 
monitoring of either quality or producer effort. The reason for this is probably the fact that the on-site 
quality control was always an efficient indicator of the crop’s quality and a sufficient incentive for the 
producer to exercise necessary effort. Thus, we do not employ the theory of incentives at its finest in this 
paper.  
Another reason for contracts and other vertical coordination enhancing arrangements is relation-
specific investments and asset specificity that give rise to the hold-up problem. Contracts ensure control, 
coordination, and thus mitigate opportunism. However, this reason is hardly valid for the peanut contracts. 
As a matter of fact, a standard forward contract specifying a delivery date and a price is a much better 
control/supply management tool than the option contract. 
Yet another reason for contracts is reducing transaction costs. While this motive can be important 
for the peanut and other contracts, we simply do not have enough information on the magnitude of these 
costs, i.e., we do not know whether negotiating, writing, and signing a forward contract implies higher 
transaction costs than concluding a spot market transaction. Besides, a spot market transaction is also a 
contract, only it is instantaneous and with just a few specifications in comparison to a forward or options 
contract.  
Another important reason for contracts is risk mitigation (risk-sharing), which helps farmers if 
contracts shift the price (or yield) risk downstream. This argument has been put forward even for crops   5 
that are CBOT traded, i.e., for which hedging is possible. This risk mitigation argument would be even 
more important for peanuts, for which hedging is not an option. However, the only forward contract 
available in the peanut market, the “option-to-purchase” contract, reduces the processors’ risk at the 
expense of the governments (the costs of the Marketing Loan Program). 
  Contracts can also be employed with a view of enhancing market power. In agriculture, the issue 
of the so-called captive supplies in the meat and poultry industries has attracted much attention (Azzam 
you-name-it). Likewise, the real purpose of the option contracts might be simple exclusion: even if the 
LRR is indeed equal to the true spot market price, the buyer pays the option price to the farmer for 
exclusion – the farmer commits to dealing with/selling to this particular buyer. Normally, the most 
straightforward reason for exclusion is driving up rivals’ costs (Rasmusen, 1991). If there is a dominant 
firm (particularly a firm that has access to cheap supply) it can “overbuy” inputs in the “general” input 
market and thus increase the rivals’ costs. For this strategy to work, production must be vulnerable for its 
special reliance on an input the supply of which must be very inelastic. Besides, the dominant firm’s 
residual demand increases more than its own marginal costs because MC of the rivals increase even more. 
The argument was pioneered by Salop (1983) and Scheffman (1987). 
  It is important to note that most of the arguments above are associated with production contracts, 
and not with marketing contracts. In production contracts, processors specify the characteristics of the 
product, even in some cases specifying the production technology and advancing inputs to the producers, 
in which case, moral hazard and risk issues are more important. In the case of peanuts, which, in 
comparison to the aforementioned cases, are a homogenous product, issues like maintaining steady input 
supply are probably more important in the contract choice. 
  Existing economic literature on forward contracts has shown that contracts that tie the base price 
to future cash prices in the same market affect both the trade volume and the price. In competitive 
markets, introduction of forward contracts based on future cash market prices has been shown to affect 
prices and quantities in a way that depends on the supply and demand specifications (Ward, Koontz, and 
Schroeder, 1998). In imperfectly competitive markets, forward contracts have anti-competitive effects, the   6 
logic being that a commitment to purchase at a spot market price in the future increases the buyers' 
marginal costs and thus provokes more aggressive behavior in the spot market. For example, Cooper 
(1986) demonstrated that most favored customer  (MFC) contracts help firms collide implicitly and 
achieve higher profits. Holt and Scheffman (1987) showed that MFC and MOR (meet-or-release) clauses 
substitute Bertrand pricing strategies with more collusive Cournot strategies.  
In agricultural economics, the issue of forward contracting has been known as the issue of 
"captive supplies" - a form of vertical integration and a means of exercising market power. The research 
on the subject has mainly focused on the meatpacking industry, particularly on the TOMP (top-of-the-
market-price) contracts (Azzam, 1998; Azzam and Anderson, 1996; Davis, 2000; Love and Burton, 1999). 
In a recent paper, Xia and Sexton (2002) modeled TOMP contracts in a Cournot duopsony setting and 
found that  
-  the profit function of the Cournot oligopsonists is single-peaked in the number of forward 
contracts they buy from the sellers. The peak is in the middle so that half of the produce is 
forward contracted and half is sold in cash market. (Oligopsonists are price-takers in their output 
market, as well as the producers in theirs.) 
-  Because of the Cournot oligopsony assumption, every other/additional forward TOMP contract 
reduces the producer surplus (by reducing the spot market and therefore forward contract prices), 
so that producers would be better off if there were no forward contracts. However, the buyers can 
get the profit maximizing number of forward contracts by offering producers a bonus for 
accepting them. Those producers that are offered a bonus accept the forward contract because they 
do not take into account the PS loss to the others (private vs. "social" loss: the collective action 
problem). Offering bonuses is profitable to the buyers as soon as the bonus payments are less than 
the profit gain. 
-  The general conclusion is that forward contracts whose price is set to equal future spot market 
prices have anti-competitive effects, which can sometimes be countered by the producers' 
collective action (i.e., organized refusal to accept forward contract offers).   7 
To the best of our knowledge, all of the existing models deal exactly with forward contracts (the ones that 
imply delivery by the seller and the buyer's obligation to buy) and with the assumption of existence of the 
cash market in which prices are set by equilibration of supply and demand.  
  The option-to-purchase contracts in the peanut and similar markets differ from the contracts 
described above because they do not imply an obligation to purchase from a producer but provide an 
exclusive right to purchase. This makes a substantive difference in a regulated market where the 
government can interfere by setting the loan repayment rates and thus affecting forward contract prices. 
It should be noted that, even with information on the legislative framework and on the contract 
structure being readily available, empirical and theoretical analysis of the welfare and distributional 
effects of agricultural contracts is hindered by lack of information about important characteristics of the 
key players in the marketing game. These attributes include the distribution of risk aversion, information 
structure, nature of competition, relative magnitude of the transaction costs, and certain aspects of price 
discovery. A brief discussion of these issues is provided in the Appendix A. 
 
  US Peanut Market Background 
The 2002 Farm Act eliminated the price and quantity fixing marketing quota system that, although 
with several modifications, was the core of the support of the peanut (since 1933) and other crop 
production. The quota system was replaced by a Marketing Assistance Loan Program (MLP) under which 
producers can get a government loan at a pre-determined Marketing Loan Rate (MLR) by pledging their 
crop as collateral.
2 During the term of the loan (9 months) producers can either forfeit the loan or repay it 
at the lesser of the Loan Repayment Rate (LRR) plus interest or the USDA-set repayment rate. The official 
purpose of setting the loan repayment rate is to "minimize potential loan forfeitures and storage costs, and 
to promote competitive marketing of peanuts both domestically and internationally." While, in a perfectly 
competitive and efficient market, setting the loan repayment rate equal to the current spot market price 
                                                 
2 Other produces eligible for the MLP include wheat, corn, barley, oats, cotton, rice, soybeans, other oilseeds, wool, 
mohair, honey, lentils, and chickpeas.   8 
would meet these goals, adopting a different rule in an imperfectly competitive, thin, or inefficient, market 
may achieve a better outcome. Producers that do not take the marketing loan are entitled to a so-called 
deficiency payment that equals the difference between the loan rate and the repayment rate.
3 
  Under the 1996 Farm Act
4, the groundnut program was a two-tier price support program, with 
groundnut production destined to food products (e.g. peanut butter, snacks, candies, etc.) limited to an 
annually established quota (i.e., “poundage quota”) designed to uphold prices at US$ 610 per short ton. 
Non-quota groundnut production (i.e., the so-called "additional") was destined for the export or the 
domestic crushing market (i.e., groundnut oil and meal) and, in 2001, it was eligible for a support price of 
US$ 132 per short ton (ERS-USDA, 2002). Figure 1 presents in a schematic way the US peanut marketing 
year before the 2002 Farm Act.  
  It should be noted from the figure that marketing peanuts was a very regulated activity, with 
farmers disposing their peanuts almost at harvest either by contracting them for export or crush, selling 
them as part of the marketing quota or pledging them to the CCC to receive the support price for 
additional peanuts. It goes without saying that, under such a system, there was no incentives for farmers to 
invest in on-farm stocks since the entire harvest was rationed and had to be marketed through the channels 
set by the USDA. In addition, this system also prevented the formation of a spot/cash market for peanuts 
since the harvest was allocated through contracts (for export or crush) or through the CCC marketing 
quota program. 
   
                                                 
3 For a thorough review of the 2002 Farm Act and its commodity market implications, see Westcott, Young, and 
Price (2002).  
4 For a background about the evolution of the US peanut program see Rucker and Thurman (1990).   9 
Figure 1. U.S. Peanut Market before the 2002 Farm Act. 
 
   Under the current regime, however, all peanut producers have equal access to the marketing 
assistance loan program.
5 Under this program, producers are eligible for a marketing loan at a rate equal to 
US$ 355 per short ton, which they can get by pledging their crop as collateral. Producers may repay the 
loan at a rate that is the lesser of: (1) USDA-determined loan repayment rate (LRR) or (2) the marketing 
loan rate (MLR) plus interest. Alternatively, farmers can forfeit the loan. Figure 2 represents the new 
program under the MLP. 
  The official purpose of setting the loan repayment rate is to "minimize potential loan forfeitures 
and storage costs, and to promote competitive marketing of peanuts both domestically and 
internationally". In a typical MLP program, setting the loan repayment rate equal to the current spot 
market price would meet these goals, something that was pointed out by Westcott and Price (2001). 
                                                 




marketing quota have Shellers purchase their requirements during the harvest and stock as much as they need,   
to be contracted before because buybacks are expensive. They have to be purchased at a price equal to 100 per-
September 15th,  cent of the quota value plus handling charges determined by the market association and a-
otherwise they must be  pproved by CCC, to cover all costs incurred with respect to such peanuts for inspection 
marketed under additional warehousing, shrinkage, and other expenses.                                                                   
nal price support loans.
US Harvest Season - Aug./Jan. US Non Harvest Season - Feb./Jul.
Seasonal Supply=Marketing quota 2/ + Stocks 3/ Seasonal Supply=Imports + Buybacks 4/
Pre-season Peanut Marketing Year - August/July
Figure 1. US Peanut Market before the 2002 Farm Act 1/
Notes:
1/ Based on 1996 Farm Act legislation.
2/ Supply for exports and crush are the quantities previously contracted.
3/ Inter-year stocks in the form of shelled peanuts.
4/ Buybacks are stocks under the CCC purchased by food processors above the marketing quota  10 
However, without a spot market to use as a reference for crop prices, setting the repayment rate becomes a 
moot point. This may be reflected in Mr. Spearman’s (2004) comment that “USDA gives no reasoning for 
leaving rates [the repayment rate] at loan level. The industry thought the process would be more 
transparent, hoping for brief weekly explanations” (“Market Watch” Section of the Peanut Grower 
bulletin, Jan/2004 issue, http://www.peanutgrower.com/home/2004_JanMarketWatch.html). 
 
   
   
 
 
With these settings in mind, the next section analyses the role of the new contracts under the new structure 
of the peanut market. 
Demand=Shellers 3/
US Harvest Season - Aug./Jan. US Non Harvest Season - Feb./Jul.
Seasonal Supply=Harvest+Stocks 1/ Seasonal Supply=Imports + Stocks 2/
Peanut Marketing Year - August/July
Figure 2. US Peanut Market after the 2002 Farm Act
Notes:
1/ Inter-year stocks (these stocks may be in shelled peanuts form).
2/ Intra-year stocks (e.g., stocks under MLP).
3/ A relatively small proportion of peanuts are exported un-shelled (e.g. 13 % in 2003)




III.  Analysis of Recent Contracts in the US Peanut Market 
 
  During the first year of the Farm Act, two contract types have been observed: "Delivery at 
Harvest" (DAH) and the "Option-to-Purchase" (OTP). While the DAH contract is a typical forward 
contract, the OTP contract is a hybrid of a forward and an option contract. The OTP contract gives the 
buyer (peanut sheller) an exclusive right but not an obligation to purchase a certain volume of the crop 
from the farmer.  
  A peculiarity of these contracts is that, while in other markets the selling price is tied to either spot 
market price or to a basis, peanut forward contracts base the price on the USDA-set repayment rate. This 
feature should not surprising since, in the absence of a developed spot market, the repayment rate is the 
only price available to use as a base. In addition, the OTP contract stipulates a separate option price that 
ensures the buyer's exclusive right to purchase.  
  The option-to-purchase contracts in the peanut and similar markets differ from the contracts 
described above because they do not imply an obligation to purchase from a producer but provide an 
exclusive right to purchase. This makes a substantive difference in a regulated market where the 
government can interfere by setting the loan repayment rates and thus affecting forward contract prices. 
Figure 3 provides an illustraton. 
 
   12 
 
  Figure 4 represents the locus of negotiation between the two instruments: the proportion of 
contracts that are exercised (ß), which is in the hands of processors, and the repayment rate, P
R, which is 
the hands of USDA, for what we may call the normal case (i.e., when the loan repayment rate is below the 
loan rate, P
L, but also above the world market price for un-shelled peanuts, P
W. Certainly, USDA can set 
the repayment rate above the loan rate, as is evident from the repayment rate values corresponding to most 
of the 2003 crop. In this situation, one would expect processors to follow a “hand to mouth” strategy in the 
hope that USDA would reduce the repayment rate in order to avoid carrying stocks to the next crop year. 
Furthermore, it is important to note that un-shelled peanuts can be stored for hardly more than 10 months. 
Therefore, unless peanuts are shelled, the shrinkage cost of carrying stocks at the end of the year might be 
significant. 
Demand=Shellers 3/
Shellers offer harvest delivery contracts and Shellers exercise the option contracts depen-
option-contracts. Deliveries at harvest go to ding on the peanut requirements and on the
shellers pipeline stocks, while peanuts under  repayment rate. There are two instruments for
the option contract are pledge as a collateral negotiation: quantity of option contracts exer
under the MLP. cised (shellers) and repayment rate (CCC).
US Harvest Season - Aug./Jan. US Non Harvest Season - Feb./Jul.
Seasonal Supply=Harvest+Stocks 1/ Seasonal Supply=Imports + Stocks 2/
Peanut Marketing Year - August/July
Figure 3. New Contracts as a Strategy for Marketing Peanuts
Notes:
1/ Inter-year stocks
2/ Intra-year stocks (e.g., stocks under MLP).
3/ A relatively small proportion of peanuts are exported un-shelled (e.g. 13 % in 2003), otherwise
    shellers are the first buyer of un-shelled peanuts.  13 
  The negotiation positions are clear: on the one hand, having issued OTP contracts, processors 
would be interested in purchasing the most of the crop at the lowest possible price (i.e., a value of ß close 
to unity and a low repayment rate P
R).  On the other hand, USDA, having the peanuts as a collateral, 
would be interested in sending them back to the market at the highest possible repayment rate (i.e., a value 
of ß close to unity, too but a high repayment rate P
R).  It is important to note that farmers are just plain 
intermediaries in the game, since the MLP ensures minimum per unit revenue (price floor).  
 
 
  Based on the previous setting, let us consider the following simple model that has the purpose to 
illustrate negotiations between the two main players: crop processors and the government. The variables to 
be determined are the proportion of OTP contracts, b, that are exercised and the repayment rate, P
R.  
  Processors offer producers one of the two contract types: delivery-at-harvest (DAH) and option-
to-purchase (OTP). Let us simplify the timing of the harvest marketing year by assuming that it consists of 







Figure 4: Normal Negotiation Range Between Processors and USDA
Notes:
ß Proportion of options that are exercised by processors
P
R MLP repayment rate
P
W Export price of un-shelled peanuts
P
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assume that processors have a very good idea of their demands for peanuts for the entire year (i.e.,  e + Q , 
where Q is the annual requirement and e  is a random error); furthermore, they know the seasonality of 
the demand that they are facing. In addition, we assume that this demand is price inelastic.
6 Therefore, the 
processors are willing to offer a number of DAH contracts equal to their requirements during the first 
period ( 1 Q ) and cover the remainder of their requirements with OTP contracts (i.e., 
{ } 1 2 max Q Q Q - + = e ).  
  In the absence of on-farm storage, all the peanut growers that do not deliver at harvest, enter the 
marketing loan program by pledging their crop as collateral for the loan. Therefore, once processors have 
issued the contracts, the available supply for peanuts is totally determined. Since the OTP contracts have 
R P  as the price base
7, the processors’ cost of the inputs purchased via the OTP contracts,  ) ( 2 Q C
P b and 
the associated costs of the MLP (
U C ) are: 
 
( ) 2 1 Q P C
R P ￿ ￿ = b  
( ) ( ) 2 2 Q P P C
R L U ￿ ￿ - = b  
  In order to illustrate possible determination of equilibrium, let us consider two separate cases: first 
when USDA knows the reaction of processors and uses this information to set the repayment rate to 
minimize its costs and, second, the symmetric case, when processors, acting in a collusive way, use the 
fact that USDA does not want to carry peanuts to the next crop year to force a given repayment rate. 
 
 
                                                 
6 Extension to the case when the demand faced by processors (i.e., peanut product manufacturer) can be easily done, 
by solving the profit maximization problem of the processor. In the case presented, we will assume that the price and 
the quantity at which the processor sells to the manufacturer is given and, therefore, we concentrate on the cost 
minimization. 
7 Processors in fact offer farmers the repayment rate plus a premium  in order to provide incentives for 
transferring control of the loan stocks. However, to simplify the model we will assume a premium equal to 
zero, since it will not change the essence of the argument.    15 
1.  USDA knows the processors’ reaction function   
 
  Let us assume that USDA knows that increases in 
R P are going to reduce the proportion of OTP 
contracts that are exercised. Therefore, we can assume a reaction function for  b  such as  ( )
R P b b = , 





. Based on this, USDA will solve the problem: 
( ) ( ) [ ] 2 3 Q P P P C Min
R R L U
P
R ￿ ￿ - = b  
  The first order necessary conditions for the minimum are given by: 
( ) ( ) 0 4 ”
¶
¶












  From (4), we can obtain USDA’s preferred loan repayment rate given it knows that processors 
will retaliate to an increase in 




















2.  Processors know USDA’s reaction function 
 
  Now, let us assume that processors know that USDA has incentives to reduce 
R P if they keep low 
values of  b . Therefore, we have  ( ) b





. Thus, colluded processors will solve 
the following problem: 
 
( ) ( ) 2 2 5 Q P Q P Max
R M P ￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿ = b b b p
b
   16 
  The first order conditions are given by: 
 
( ) ( )
















M P is the price paid by manufacturers for shelled peanuts.  We are assuming this price is given to 












R R P P
 
  It is important to note from these two illustrative cases that the final result from the negotiation 
depends on the assumptions about each one of the players, and about the knowledge that each has about 
the other player strategies.  
 
 
IV.  Conclusions 
 
  The purpose of this paper was to a nalyze the two types of marketing contracts, “delivery at 
harvest” (DAH) and “option to purchase” (OTP), which have emerged between producers and processors 
in the peanut market. In this sense, the paper contributes to a better understanding of the role of delivery 
options in agricultural markets.  
  We find that the current contracts in the peanut market may be understood as a marketing strategy 
that tries to fill the gap left by the elimination of the former marketing quota system. Before the 2002 
Farm Act, marketing peanuts was a very regulated activity, with farmers disposing their peanuts almost at 
harvest either by contracting them for export or crush, or selling them as part of the marketing quota. This 
situation did not produce incentives for farmers to invest on on-farm stocks, since the entire harvest had to 
be marketed according to the lines set by USDA. In addition, this system also prevented the formation of a 
spot/cash market for peanuts since the harvest was allocated through contracts (for export or crush) or 
through the CCC marketing quota program.   17 
  Under the MLP, the virtual absence of a spot market necessary for setting the repayment rate by 
the USDA has become an urgent issue. Nevertheless, the industry uses the repayment rate as the base for 
the new contracts. In this context, the OTP contracts play two roles: first, they increase the shellers’ 
flexibility when purchasing peanuts during the after-harvest period and, second, they may be used a 
safeguard in negotiating (explicitly or implicitly) with the USDA when the latter determines the MLP 
repayment rate. In fact, the illustrative model that we show confirms that it is possible for either of the 
players to determine the optimal value of their instruments provided they know the reaction of the 
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APPENDIX A. Issues with Empirical and Theoretical Analysis of Agricultural Contracts.   
 
Even with information on the legislative framework and on the contract structure being available, 
empirical and theoretical analysis of the welfare and distributional effects of agricultural contracts is 
hindered by lack of information about important characteristics of the key players in the marketing 
game. These attributes include, 
 
1)  Risk aversion. It remains to be determined whether agricultural processors should be treated/modeled 
as risk averse and, if yes, whether they are more risk averse than the producers. Producer risk aversion 
and  processor/food manufacturer risk neutrality (as well as declining absolute risk aversion and 
constant relative risk aversion of the producers) have been almost standard assumptions in modeling 
agricultural markets. However, the downstream entities should not always be viewed as more risk 
neutral than the producer. Some crop processors and elevators that are owned by large and well 
diversified corporations, whose assets are capable of processing and storing different crops (soybeans, 
corn, or wheat), and whose supplies come from different geographical areas, can reasonably be treated 
as only negligibly averse to both price and yield risks. However, in industries where crop processing 
requires crop-specific equipment and that have historically evolved small private ownership structure, 
significant processor risk aversion may be a more appropriate assumption. This is likely to be the case 
in peanut processing, where peanut processors – the shellers – both store and process (shell) raw 
peanuts using peanut-specific assets (shelling machinery) that can not be employed elsewhere.  
 
2)  Information structure. Finding out, or specifying, what the players in the marketing game actually 
know, is probably a more daunting task than modeling their risk aversion. In particular, producer 
awareness of the planting decisions and other actions of the other producers, of the nature of 
competition among the processors, of the processing output prices,  etc., is crucial for modeling 
outcomes. Assumptions range from virtually omniscient producers to short-sighted adaptive   19 
expectations. While it is obvious that the producers are neither of these two extremes, more precise 
specification of the game’s information structure, as well as the players’ rationality, seems 
problematic. 
 
Nature of competition. While the existence of at least some oligopsonistic market power on behalf of 
the processors is a more or less accepted reality, the nature of interaction among the processors is not 
totally clear. While a lot of studies automatically assume (dynamic) Cournot-Nash competition among 
the processors, others find empirical evidence of tacit collusion in a repeated game setting based on 
time-series data showing periodic collusion breakdown and subsequent price wars. Assuming the 
latter instead of the former means a world of difference in modeling outcomes.  
 
3)  Transaction costs. One of the purposes of contracts is reduction of transaction costs. While this 
motive can be important for many an agricultural contract, we simply do not have enough information 
about the magnitude of these costs, i.e., we do not know whether negotiating, writing, and signing a 
forward contract implies higher transaction costs than concluding a spot market transaction. Besides, a 
spot market transaction is also a contract, albeit instantaneous and with fewer stipulations that a 
forward or options contract.  
 
4)  Price discovery/market efficiency. The purpose of agricultural markets, as well as any other market, 
is to ensure efficient allocation of resources by equilibrating supply and demand. When information 
about aggregate supply and aggregate demand is unknown or imperfect, it is better to leave price and 
quantity determination to the free markets while ensuring the market agents play a fair game. Finding 
the truly allocation-efficient market price usually requires free competitive markets where large 
volumes of demand and supply meet for sufficiently long time to settle on a market clearing price. 
Little empirical research in agricultural economics has been done on the subject of what it takes to 
determine efficient prices and quantities.    20 
 
Because of the difficulties associated with specifying the market and market players’ attributes mentioned 
above, we do not attempt to construct a policy recommendation generating model of market effects of 
forward option-like contracts in this paper. Specifying such a model would involve making moot but 
pivotal assumptions based on the limited knowledge of agricultural markets, which would produce results 
that are hardly interesting. 
 